Abstract -Expectations about higher economic growth and the ever increasing demand for higher bandwidth and more reliable networks are driving the worldwide deployment of NextGeneration Access (NGA) networks. The paths followed to achieve this goal markedly vary, however, across different countries. This paper offers a comparison of a handful of leading NGA deployments that rely on different investment models. We study the broadband national initiatives of New Zealand and Australia and a group of selected regional NGA deployments in Europe.
Introduction
Current trends in increasing demand for faster and more reliable broadband (BB) connections stimulate the deployment of Next-Generation Access (NGA) networks. However, deploying new infrastructure, especially Fibre-to-the-Premises (FTTP), requires significant levels of investment. Different economic investment models are currently being used worldwide to steer the deployments, ranging from no government intervention (fully private deployment), to a collaboration of private companies and public actors in a Public-Private Partnership (PPP), to public procurement or even fully government-driven and publicly-operated rollout.
Furthermore, variants in scale of deployment can be identified: small rural town initiatives, regional solutions or nationwide projects.
The nationwide PPP Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) network initiated by the government of New Zealand and the fully government-owned and funded Australian National Broadband Network (NBN) contrast sharply with the European local initiatives, which use mixed models of investment and are subject to constraints imposed on public money spending. Whereas the public partners (governments and local authorities) focus on increasing broadband coverage and stimulating the broadband ecosystem, private partners seek to establish a successful business case to the satisfaction of their shareholders. However a common aspect of the mixed deployment types is the alignment of goals by both public and private parties.
The cases identified in this paper not only cover different sizes in the scale of deployment but insightfully cover the spectrum of public and private modes of participation in infrastructure deployment. With the latter in mind, we aim to reveal the relationship between indicators of goal achievement and the characteristics of the investment vehicles. For example, qualitatively finding and assessing a relationship between the estimated amounts of risk shifted onto a private partner and the speed of deployment. Thus, the paper defines a common framework for effective comparison of the above-mentioned country and regional cases.
Inspired by (Melody, 2013) a Technology-Policy-Market interaction framework 1 is proposed that allows for a clear mapping of the incentives, goals and actions of the different players in the field. Looking on the investment model used from a multi-domain perspective (technology, policy and the market) broadens our view and allows us to reach richer conclusions. This framework is applied to the following NGA deployment cases: New Zealand´s UFB, the publicly-owned dark fibre infrastructure provider Stokab in Stockholm (Sweden), the fully government-funded NBN project in Australia, a PPP under the Market Economy Investors Principle in Amsterdam (the Netherlands), a PPP initiated by the community in Catalonia, Spain, and a private initiative undertaken by the different providers, mainly the incumbent, in
Portugal. These cases were chosen because they represent different types of investment mechanisms and so they cover the range of investment models of interest.
The goal of this paper is to investigate, on a case-to-case basis, the links between the choice of investment model, including the level of public and private involvement, and several factors that speak about the success of a NGA deployment. Then the paper identifies the drivers for investment in each case and the investment mechanism and looks into indicators relating to the main goals of the infrastructure deployment such as coverage and speed of deployment. As an important factor in the creation of incentives for private investment the paper also identifies the risk types shared between the partners across cases, whenever a partnership is the preferred vehicle for deployment. Placed on a straight segment with one end representing full government stewardship of a next-generation broadband access deployment and the other end representing fully private investment, the cases studied in this paper would sufficiently and variedly cover the space in between. Besides, their low number does not allow for a statistical approach to identifying correlation between factors and the measurement of interest.
The paper unfolds as follows: after providing an introduction to PPPs and government intervention in broadband deployment, the technology, policy and market aspects are brought together in the interaction framework presented. Next, the UFB programme in New Zealand, the NBN in Australia, and regional initiatives in Europe are respectively described and analysed. Following comparison criteria are used to highlight the commonalities and differences in how those cases have performed thus far. Conclusions and recommendations are formulated as a closure to the paper.
PPPs and government intervention in BB deployment
This section presents a definition of the mechanism that allows a government to enter a partnership to undertake an infrastructure construction project and an overview of the range of options a government may rely upon when private participation is needed or preferred. In addition it introduces concepts, key to the assessment of performance of those NGA deployments examined here.
Although acceptance of FTTP as the preferred type of NGA deployment is not universal, the political decisions that have favoured deploying fibre to the customer look forward to futureproof the access network with the most reliable and capable technology available today.
Politics aside, when a type of greenfield NGA is to be deployed in urban or sub-urban areas, technology and demand factors have shown that FTTP is preferred 2 . As investment incentives for private operators to upgrade their networks to full fibre networks 3 have been absent, some governments have tried alternative financial initiatives. These initiatives have included both private and public investment (financing structure), as well as different forms of "authority aid", mainly in the form of laws or regulations. In this paper, we will mainly focus on the choice for and impact of the financing structure. Where deemed useful and to make the analysis relevant to policy makers, the paper also links the financial aspects to relevant regulatory decisions. Figure 1 gives an overview of the five main financing structures that can be identified for large projects (not limited to telecommunication networks deployments). They range from 100% public investment to 100% private investment:
Forms of public and private participation in infrastructure project
-In the complete government production and delivery, a public institution is responsible for the planning, deployment and maintenance of the project.
-When a public party invests the funds, but outsources the execution (and possible operations or maintenance) of the project to private partners, the investments mechanism is referred to as public procurement.
-A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is characterized by both public and private investment, and hence, both public and private risk. This investment mechanism will be described in more detail further below.
-The fourth mechanism is a concession, frequently also referred to as a tender. In this case, the public party grants a private partner the rights to deploy and operate an infrastructure (or to execute and maintain a project). The private partner relies on revenues from the project's users, to recoup its investment. In this case, the private investment (and risk) is higher than in the case of a PPP.
-Full Private Investment is the final financing structure, and involves no public investment.
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Depending on the level of government involvement, different legal frameworks allow or forbid some of these investment mechanisms. In general, European policy holds that government intervention should only be allowed in cases where the market is not delivering the right quality and/or quantity. Lemstra and Groenewegen 5 (2009) argue that governments should only intervene in case of a market failure, where it has been proven that the private market players have tried to correct the failure without any result. In this situation, the authorities can either use competition law to correct the abuse of market power, or set specific regulation on standards (quality of service) or impose price corrections through the use of taxes and subsidies.
Here, it should be noted that the European regulation on public involvements is specified in specific terms, and hence significantly different from other parts in the world. More precisely, we refer to the distinction between white, grey and black areas (European Commission, 2009);  in principle, only in white areas is public subsidy in network allowed. As an exception, there are two scenarios in which public investment is not regarded as State Aid in accordance with the Case-law of the European Communities ("ECJ"):
-If the part of the investment that falls under the responsibility of the State can be used 
Defining PPPs in the context of broadband expansion
A PPP finds the middle point between public and private investment, and is defined as a contract between an authority (e.g. the national government or a municipality) and one or more private partners 7 . By including both public and private money, the alignment of objectives can be achieved: that is, the service-delivery objective of the public parties along with the profitmaximization of the private parties 8 , making the agreement mutually beneficial and economical 9 . Another approach towards PPPs is seeing it as lying between the government and the market 10 , with the government representing centralized control of transactions and the market representing decentralized control.
One key aspect that differentiates PPPs from traditional procurement models is the fact that the agreement involves a risk-transfer mechanism; i.e. the private partners in a PPP must bear an agreed share of the (financial) risk, and as such are incentivized to deliver the product as 6 The four conditions to meet in accordance with the Altmark criteria, as defined to in Article 86(2) of the Treaty of the European Community, are: a) the beneficiary of a State funding mechanism must be formally entrusted with the provision and discharge of a SGEI; b) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be established beforehand to avoid an economic advantage over competing undertakings; c) the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; and d) the level of compensation granted must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. Where government participation is present, the drivers for investment are grounded on expectations of social return and economic benefit in the medium-term. Stakeholders in the deployment of an NGA network want to see construction deadlines met and targeted households reached. We are therefore relying on "coverage" (target and actual) as one indicator of the degree of success in meeting the goals.
It has also been recognised that private investment would not be able to provide a high-speed infrastructure before a desired point in time. In particular, due to the uncertain nature of NGA returns, the increasing demand for broadband services, and government goals for the reduction of the digital divide 13 several regional European governments have invested in deployment of NGAs. Timing becomes then a pressing factor as government need to deliver on their broadband plans. In our assessment such need is represented on the speed of deployment (relative to targets) as another indicator included in our analysis.
A third aspect in the assessment is the level of risk involved in the deployment of an NGA.
When the vehicle to expand broadband is a PPP one defining characteristic of the agreement is risk-sharing and the type and amount of risk transferred to the private partner shape the contractual relationship. Risk transfer is inherently linked to PPPs as part of the investment risk that should be borne by the private party. Beltrán 14 argues that "it is the degree of risk transfer from the government onto the private party that determines the real nature of the contractual relationship between them".
Lacking accurate data about the financials of the cases analysed here, our approach is the identification, not the calculation, of the risk type involved in each of the investment mechanisms used by the broadband initiatives. We use a categorisation of risk advocated by OECD 15 , which first divides risk between commercial risk, on one hand, and legal and political risk, on the other. In turn, commercial risk is further split into demand and supply risks. The former refers mainly to changes on the consumer side such as uptake and use of broadband services, as well as other commercial offers of substitute and complementary services, and financial risks affecting demand. The latter, intimately linked to the "ability of the private partner to deliver" 16 and is divided into of construction risk -risks mainly associated with the availability and costs of inputs -and operation risk. In our descriptive assessment, we address the components of commercial risks.
Technology -Policy -Market interaction framework
Although the development of new products and services is facilitated by technology, they only make it into the market when demand for them has built up. Similarly, if market dynamics do not provide enough incentives for operators to, for instance, adopt new technologies and upgrade the networks, government intervention in the form of acts, laws or regulation could be justified. Finally, markets don't develop or evolve independent from policy decisions or technological innovations.
As such, the studied fibre deployment cases should be investigated within a framework that uses these three domains: technology, policy and market. Following the research by Melody 
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The policy pillar comprises all laws, guidelines, regulations and directives that impact the deployment of FTTH either directly or indirectly. They can be made on local, regional, national or international level. Examples include wholesale price regulation, competition law, Digital
Agenda guidelines, etc.
The third and final pillar, the market, combines all commercial and strategic decisions, both by the end-user and by the industry players itself. Examples include the customer's decision to take up on a fibre connection, the retailers' service offers in terms of speeds and caps and the NGA platform's wholesale tariff structure.
Next we will link the Technology-Policy-Market interaction framework used for analysing the cases to both factors of characterization and indicators of performance to evaluate the success of PPP in the deployment of fibre access networks. By focusing on the decisions made by actors in the three different pillars of the framework, the effect of their decisions on the other pillars can be studied, and possible interaction identified. Applying the framework on the financial decisive phase of different FTTH initiatives across New Zealand and Europe, allows analysing both the drivers behind implementing a certain investment model, as well as the success of that model on the specific initiative.
A nationwide public-private partnership in New Zealand
New Zealand government committed NZD $1.5 billion to a FTHH network aimed to reach 75% of households and businesses, an initiative known as the Ultra-Fast Broadband network 17 .
The remainder is to be served mainly by the Rural Broadband Initiative, through investment in wireless connectivity and VDSL connections. Crown Fibre Holdings (CFH), a publicly-owned company, was created to manage the investment funds. In 2017 CFH denomination was changed to Crown Infrastructure Partners (CIP) Limited, expanding CFH's initial purpose 18 .
A tender process saw four private companies win shares in the total investment funds to deploy the UFB. Three of these four partners are known as Local Fibre Companies (LFCs) and will eventually own and operate the network on a wholesale-only basis. They are: NorthPower Fibre, UltraFast Fibre, and Enable Services. Chorus, the fourth and largest partner established from a demerger of Telecom New Zealand into a wholesale company owning the network (Chorus) and a retailer (Spark), is not a LFC but instead CIP invests directly in it in the form of non-voting equity and debt securities.
The PPP was structured in two different models: the "funds-recycling" model with the LFCs, and the "investment" model with Chorus. The contract with the LFCs is based on the recycling of capital in which CIP funds the fibre passing (the dark fibre, Layer 1 network deployed along the streets) and when a customer shows interest to subscribe to fibre services the LFC then funds the drop section (from the street to the customer's premises). A subscription-based retail commercial relation then starts between the customer and a retail service provider, which in turn pays for capacity to the LFC at wholesale prices. This income is then used by the LFC to buy a share in the UFB network (so far owned by CIP), gradually acquiring ownership of the entire network as services are deployed. CIP in turn can re-invest the regained funds in network deployments elsewhere. The government's UFB network initiative could be described as a 'reverse PPP', where the government initially owns the PPP entity, takes risk and provides seed capital to private-sector partners to build the network, and then eventually sells out to privatesector partners 19 .
The contract signed with Chorus is different in the sense that CIP invests directly in Chorus as a company, but Chorus bears the main risks of the uncertain demand uptake. In return for this government loan, Chorus has to comply with specific coverage and uptake goals, set on milestone dates. Regulatory risks manifested in the changes to the regulation of the copper network, which led to a major change in Chorus composition of ownership with government investment funds replacing foreign capital 20 . In addition, the government has retained the power to exert control of Chorus if the provider does not meet its targets 21 .
Australia's National Broadband Network
The National Broadband Network ( 
The case of Stokab in Stockholm
Driven by the incentive to increase the economic attractiveness of the region of Stockholm, the city decided to invest in a FTTP deployment. Stokab, founded in 1994, is a public company, 100% owned by the city of Stockholm, and was established to deploy a dark fibre access infrastructure to all businesses and households in the Stockholm region. The company was founded as a public infrastructure company (comparable to other public firms responsible for road, railway etc.); all the development, deployment and operations is in direct hands of the company, no outsourcing is done. As the deployment started before the EU State Aid regulation was established, its public involvement was not questioned.
In its initial phase, the network rollout was financed by publicly-backed loans. As a first goal, the network aimed at connecting mainly public and educational institutions, but was quickly expanded towards private businesses, which requested to be connected on the dark fibre circuits. Although being a public company, taxpayer's money was never used. Instead, the initial €300 million investment was based on loans backed by the city of Stockholm, while the customers' revenues provided the necessary funds for a later expansion of the network. although the majority of their profits is still re-invested in maintenance and further expansion of the network.
As in the first years, the deployment was mainly focused on larger businesses and public buildings, the speed of deployments (in terms of buildings passed) was not very high. The rollout speeded up drastically when the focus shifted to connecting more residential users, in the beginning of the 2000s. In mid-2013, 90% of households and 100% of businesses in Stockholm had access to the fibre network. The goal of creating ultrafast reliable connections to the highly knowledge-intensive region that would "meet future communications needs, stimulate competition, promote diversity, offer freedom of choice and minimise the need for excavation" 24 , has definitely been reached. Stockholm is now home to a number of successful international companies (e.g. Skype, Spotify and Transmode), all of which were attracted to the "most densely fibred city in Europe".
Deployments in the Netherlands: the case of Amsterdam
In the case of Amsterdam, the city wanted to explore the importance of high-speed connectivity to the economic well-being of the city, and launched a formal investigation into the best way to proceed. Based on the outcome of several studies with and without the collaboration of the national incumbent, KPN, and the local cable operator, UPC, the municipality decided to create a public-private partnership (PPP) to invest in a passive fibre infrastructure. This PPP, GNA (Glasvezelnet Amsterdam BV) was incorporated with three groups of investors -the municipality itself, the housing associations and the private sector-each investing €6 million 23 Broberg, A., "Challenges for an open physical infrastructure provider." 24 Stokab, "This is Stokab." in return for a one third stake in the company. Another €12 million in funding was provided as debt financing, bringing the total investment to €30 million. Although GNA was taken to court multiple times by the cable operators, the public investment was eventually allowed under the Market Economy Investor Principle:
-All shareholders should invest under the same conditions in a profitable business with an acceptable risk/reward ratio.
-The network should be operated using the 'open network' concept, meaning that the wholesale specifies that all service providers must be able to purchase transport capacity on non-discriminatory conditions.
This investment fund of €30 million was used to cover about 40,000 homes with fibre access, this process took about 2.5 years and finished in February 2009. Then, GNA announced to connect the remaining parts of the city (420,000 homes in total) by 2013, and estimated an overall budget of €300 million to do so 25 . Soon, however, the ownership structure in
Amsterdam changed, as Reggefiber (a passive infrastructure provider set up by an investment company (Reggeborgh)), bought about 70% of the shares, in a partnership with KPN (the Dutch incumbent). This evolution made tracking the actual process of the initial project hard. Though the project evolved in a different way than it was initially started, it remains an interesting example of how a PPP can be set up, and proved an example of multiple other, smaller, regional initiatives.
In general, across the Netherlands, most of the early first Dutch FTTH initiatives were taken by municipalities. Later on FTTH deployment in the Netherlands was mainly driven by 
Mainly private investment in Portugal
Although Finally, in other areas of Portugal (the mainly rural, non-competitive areas), the government opened public tenders for the deployment of a wholesale network that would cover 50% of the 31 Anacom, "Mercados grossistas de acesso à infraestrutura de rede num local fixo e de acesso em banda larga (in Portuguese)."
32 Portugal Telecom, "PT moves forward with wholesale offer for fiber network."
targeted population with a minimum download bandwidth of 40 Mbps. In these areas, Portugal
Telecom deploys an open access network with a wholesale offer for passive access 33 .
Comparison of deployments
For all cases studied here Table 3 summarises the information used for estimating the speed of deployment, the measurement of comparison for which enough data is available.
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Having summarised the main aspects of the country and region cases above within the domains of the Technology-Policy-Market framework, we turn now to draw a comparative assessment across the groups of international deployments. We first use the data available about deployment and time to achieve it to provide a quantitative approach to the speed of deployment, before turning to a more qualitative comparative analysis based on the information on Tables 1 and 2 .
An estimate of the speed of deployment is obtained by taking account of the number of fibre connections reported over a period of time. Although several issues may arise, calculating such gradient provides a comparator that allows observing a difference across deployments. The difficulties with this approach lie on selecting a meaningful time interval over which construction is advanced under somewhat normal conditions (for instance, in accordance to plans). Also, when disturbances have arisen that impeded the steady delivery of connections passed, the duration of such time interval should be long enough to offset or amortize their effects. Table 3 displays the values of the number-of-connections-passed to total-time-of-deployment ratio as a proxy to the speed of deployment for selected periods of time in most cases discussed here. The table also adds a measurement of speed of deployment per 1,000 people to take account of the size of the population target for each deployment.
In spite of the differences in the overall size of each initiative, all deployments are urban as far as FTTP concerns. Nationwide deployments take longer and achieve comparatively higher deployment rates than their city counterparts. The Australian and Stokab cases are presented in two stages, with the split in each case corresponding to major policy changes either during construction or as a result of an expansion of the original plan, respectively, , as Table 3 shows.
These figures alongside the New Zealand ones show how progress in initial build up stages is slower than progress at later times.
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Returning to the summaries provided by Tables 1 and 2 , New Zealand's UFB initiative sets 75% -upgraded to 85% with the addition of the second phase of the project in 2016 -as the targeted proportion of households with passing fibre; the coverage goal in NZ is similar to that found in Portugal but in local (city) initiatives the targets are much higher. Australia's plan relies on a mix of technologies that aim at 76% coverage using fibre (in different standards).
Coordination and scale issues cause a nationwide project face bigger hurdles as the geographic area to cover is much larger than in the citywide cases.
City governments can plan for and target almost all premises, especially in conditions where population density is rather high, 4,892 and 3,597 people per sq. km in Stockholm and
Amsterdam, respectively 34 . An increase in population density leads in general to a decrease in network deployment cost 35 . In spite of its lower population density -17 people per sq. km, and also because of that, New Zealand did not commit to a higher target. Neither is the rural part of the country targeted by the Portuguese plan, at least not at the present stage. New Zealand's UFB original decision to only reach 75% of population was based on a cost-coverage tradeoff, one that a smaller scale deployment with less cost per home passed would not have to face.
On the other hand, a governmental initiative would normally be expected to focus more on 34 Wikipedia, "Population density of European cities." In Amsterdam, the cable (DOCSIS) operator UPC took the municipality's investment plan to court, because it was said to distort a well-functioning market. Although granted in the end, these court processes delayed the entire project significantly, and as such had a massive impact on the termination dates. In Stockholm, the initial network deployment was not set at a target speed of deployment, but was rather adjusted to market demand. Now that the network is operational and mature, targets are being set to connect the remainder of the homes.
With the exception of Australia's NBN, the fibre deployments have proven effective when government was or has been involved. These cases show an on-or above-target speed of deployment, with a warning message about how regulatory uncertainties may have a delaying effect on the progress of the deployment. In the case of Portugal, targets are more than met, and before target date, but as private operators not always disclose their goals, it is difficult to draw robust conclusions here.
Evaluating the links between the investment mechanism, the initiative drivers and the risk transfers reveals a strong relationship between the social-benefit driver and the investment of public money. In Australia, New Zealand and Amsterdam, the drivers followed the results of reports denoting the importance of broadband to society 36 , and in the latter two cases a PPP with significant private risk (equal private/public risk in Amsterdam) was used as an investment vehicle. In Stockholm, the city reacted to a request from businesses to be connected on a very high-speed, technology-neutral network. The investment there was fully public (publiclybacked loans) but the deploying company, Stokab, was set up to achieve return on investment rather quickly. In Portugal the driver was set by the market (emerging competition), and hence, the reaction to invest was also fully private. In conclusion, a competition driver is followed by a market response, a demand driver can be answered by a market or a public response, and a societal driver influences policy, the pillar that then leads the initiative.
As per the choice for either a purely public or a PPP investment, the link to the driver is less clear. Here, a significant influence of regulation on the policy pillar can be identified. For example, in the case of Amsterdam, purely public investment was not allowed, whereas alignment of the investment and sharing of the risk was a necessary condition for public involvement. One can tentatively conclude that the driver is crucial for the choice of investment mechanism, but the magnitude of public involvement is largely defined by regulatory rules. it is also fully vertically integrated, not even having to unbundle its network.
Considering the topology deployed (P2P or P2MP), it is harder to draw conclusions about impacting factors from the policy or market side. In general, open access is easier to be offered on a P2P network (one dedicated fibre per end-user is available), and therefore public parties tend to support P2P deployment more. In New Zealand however, cost considerations changed this initial idea towards a GPON deployment with a limited percentage of P2P access that should be granted upon request.
Of course, this topology decision also impacts the amount of risk incurred, as deploying P2P is more expensive, but does not generate significantly higher revenues from most (residential) users. The latter allows us to claim a link is found between the deployment decision and the investment mechanism. On the other hand, P2P allows for easy dark fibre access, which was a crucial factor in the topology decision in Stockholm, as up to 50% of Stokab's revenue comes from business customers (banks, media companies, etc.), who lease dark fibre directly (so bypassing service providers).
Conclusions and recommendations
Although is it generally recognised that the next step in broadband networks is the evolution to NGA, with a strong preference for FTTP networks, the investment required to actually deploy these networks is regarded as too high by many current telecom operators. As the importance of fast and reliable broadband to society and economic growth has been proven, more and more public actors decide to step in by investing in NGA networks; the ensuing projects, either local, regional or national, face multiple constraints, from capped budgets to regulatory norms to international trading and investment agreements.
This paper provided an extensive descriptive analysis of 6 different NGA deployment cases worldwide and studied the investment mechanisms used in these cases, with a focus on PublicPrivate Partnerships, by investigating the technology, policy and market interactions, and evaluates the success of the deployment in terms of deployment speed and coverage.
In general, our analysis showed the importance of the policy pillar in the deployments studied, be it as full investment, participation in a PPP or indirect aid in the form of regulatory holidays.
The policy pillar furthermore showed to impact the technological pillar significantly, in obliging open access on a dark fibre (P2P topology) or bitstream (P2MP topology -GPON architecture) layer. The impact of the market pillar is limited in case of a public investment or PPP, but significant in the case of a private deployment, as there, the competitive threat provided a driver for investment. In all cases, the initiative lies with the policy or market pillar, and the technology pillar follows. In cases where the market takes the initiative, the technology pillar is less restricted than in policy-led cases.
The coverage targets are higher (in percentage of households) in smaller-scale deployments, as the range of cost per home passed is smaller and as such provides for easier planning. Although it could be expected that a government-driven deployment would target 100% of population (as to cancel out the digital divide), cost-coverage trade-offs have reduced this target, at least for FTTH coverage. In terms of speed of deployment, publicly-backed initiatives tend to achieve on or above targets.
Although the described cases here follow different approaches, Public-Private Partnerships are identified as a very promising option, implemented e.g. New-Zealand, Amsterdam and Stockholm. The main advantage of a PPP is probably that it combines the strengths and goals of public and private players. Public players reduce the risk for private players, and at the mean time make sure that the offers that are put on the market are fair and reasonable. Private players see a more reliable business case, but are still driven to employ their technical knowledge strengths to the maximum in order to minimize their own risk and ensuring sufficient return on investment.
Evaluating the success of NGA and FTTH deployments of course goes beyond assessing the coverage and speed of deployment. The work in this paper could be further extended towards including other evaluation characteristics, to fully investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of the cases. Effectiveness denotes whether the set goals are reached, and can span characteristics ranging from target coverage and speed of deployment, to uptake and envisaged return on investment. Efficiency measures the way the goals were reached, which includes budget evaluation and operational monitoring. 
